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LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENT OF
CORPORATION

STATUTES

-

THE WISCONSIN PROBLEM
KENNETH K. LUCE

Observations have been made upon frequent occasion in the recent
past, in articles in legal publications' and at meetings of the various
Bar Associations,2 that the Wisconsin statutes concerning corporations
are in need of extensive overhaul and revision. It has been suggested
with some reason that Wisconsin follow Minnesota, Ohio, Illinois3
and other states in the enactment of an integral and comprehensive
4
act, and thus terminate the endless process of patchwork amendment.
The feeling has been that only in this fashion may the state obtain
a body of corporation statutes which will allow corporations organized
under Wisconsin law to achieve the organizational flexibility necessary
to modem business and financial method. Business men have evidenced
reluctance to incorporate in Wisconsin.5 Some of this may be attributed
to the relatively high incorporation fees, but probably more is due
to advantages and flexibility to be gained from incorporation elsewhere. No doubt many business promoters consider these factors
seriously when qualifying their ventures to meet the problems and
competition involved in present-day business enterprise.
The difficulty in Wisconsin lies not in undue restriction inherent
in present corporation statutes, or in lack of foundation in sound
principle, but rather in an absence of completeness sufficient adequately
to inform corporate management of its powers and responsibilities.
Many important matters are omitted entirely in the statutes; and
others are so ambiguously stated that the attorney hesitates to advise
his corporate client with regard to action considered proper and neces1 Garrison, "Proposed Redraft of the Wisconsin Corporation Laws," 12 Wis. L.

Rev. 417 (1937) ; Levin, "Blind Spots ir the present Wisconsin General Corporation Statutes," 1939 Wis. L. Rev. 173.
2 28 Reports of State Bar Association of Wisconsin 22 (1938), address by Dean
Lloyd K. Garrison.
3 The Ohio General Corporation Act became effective June 9, 1927. See Wright,
"The New Ohio General Corporation Act," 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 753 (1927).
The Illinois Business Corporation Act was adopted in 1933; Illinois Rev. Stat.
(State Bar Asso. ed. 1945), Ch. 32.
4 Solether and Jennings, "The Minnesota Business Corporation Act," 12 Wis. L.
Rev. 419 (1937); Sterling, "Modernizing California's Corporation Laws," 12
Wis. L. Rev. 453 (1937); Katz, "The Illinois Business Corporation Act," 12
Wis. L. Rev. 473 (1937); Davies, "Reflections of the Amateur Draftsmen of
the Ohio General Corporation Act," 12 Wis. L. Rev. 487 (1937). The last general revision of Wisconsin corporation statutes was in 1927. Laws of Wis.
(1927), Ch. 534. However this appears to have been a patchwork revision in
which the main body of the pre-existing law was retained intact.
5 Shiels, "Why do Wisconsin Concerns Incorporate in other States?" 11 Wis.
L. Rev. 457 (1936).
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sary by business judgment, for fear of lack of statutory authority.
For instance, there are no provisions concerning merger, consolidation,
or cumulative voting; and general ambiguity in the voting provisions
sometimes makes it difficult to conclude a voting trust is authorized,
or that voting may be had on a particular question by classes. 6 Also
there are no provisions for controlling dissenting stockholders through
appraisal and payment for their shares.
The 1945 Session of the Legislature produced several commendable amendments to the corporation statutes,7 but it has been observed
that the amendments were merely a further extension of the patchwork process.8 Action by the Legislature to enact a general corporation act which will amount to a comprehensive revision of the entire
structure is to be anticipated for some future time. This article has
been prepared with this in mind, and for the purpose of indicating
such constitutional limitations as there may be upon the power of
majority9 stockholders to avail themselves of the benefit of the provisions of any such general revision against the dissent of minority
stockholders. 10 The article concerns the power of majority stockholders
See Stoelting Brothers Co. v. Stoelting, 246 Wis. 109, 16 N. W. 2d. 367 (1944) ;
Goetzinger v. Donahue, 138 Wis. 103, 119 N. W. 823 (1909) ; Brey v. Jones, 190
Wis. 578, 209 N. W. 675 (1926) ; Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 182.15, for authority
concerning voting trusts. Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 182.15, as amended by Ch.538,
sec. 1., Laws of Wis. (1945), governing voting in general makes no reference
to voting by classes, nor does Wis. Stat. (1943) sec. 180.07, governing majority
amending power. See also Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 180.11 (2). Amendments require "a vote of two-thirds of all the stock outstanding, and entitled to vote,
* * * unless a greater vote ** * be required in its articles ;" while Sec. 182.15
states "every stockholder * * * shall be.entitled to one vote for each share of
stock held and owned by him at every meeting," unless "a provision to the contrary is inserted in the articles." Many questions are left unanswered by these
provisions. Presumably each shareholder is entitled to one vote for each share
on each question raised and each director elected at a meeting. This is the usual
corporate practice, but the section fails to say even this, but rather might be
construed to mean one vote per share per entire meeting. In the face of such
initial ambiguity, there naturally is question as to how far one may go in inserting in the articles provisions "to the contrary," regarding such matters as
cumulative voting, voting by classes on certain questions, etc. These matters
will be more fully discussed later in this article. Voting by classes has been
expressly authorized on a few questions, namely changes in relation to preferred
stock; Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 182.13 (3), as amended by Ch. 467, Laws of Wis.
(1945); and changes in capital applicable to no-par shares by amendment to
Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 182.14 in Laws of Wis. (1945), Ch. 350, sec. 1.
7 Laws of Wis. (1945),
Chapters 350, 372, 462, 465, 467, 539, 572, 538, and 573.
Statutory consolidation and merger for nonstock corporations was added by
Chapter 48.
8 Clemons, "1945 Amendments to Business Corporation Statutes," 6 Milw. Bar
Asso. Gavel, No. 3, p. 7 (1945).
9 Wherever used in this article, the word "majority" shall refer to the per cent
of stockholders, as a whole or by classes, required by the corporation statutes to
take the corporate action in question in the particular context. For instance, Wis.
Stat. (1943), sec. 180.07 requires a "vote of two-thirds of all the stock outstanding, and entitled to vote," for amendments to the articles of a business corporation, "unless a greater vote shall be required in its articles."
10 This problem was considered with respect to the Ohio General Corporation Act
in Dodd, "Amendment of Corporate Articles under the new Ohio General Cor6
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to take corporate action under authority conferred upon them by new
statutes. Previous to these new statutes such corporate action may
have been ultra vires, beyond all corporate authority, or it may have
been within corporate authority through unanimous stockholder action, but still beyond majority power. Whether it was one or the
other is not material to the problem here discussed. If proposed
action is ultra vires, in excess of any authority conferred upon the
corporation by the state, it is obviously in excess of majority power.
But when intra vires, the proposed action still may be beyond majority
power against the legally asserted challenge of a dissenting stockholder, particularly wlen the latter acquired his shares before the
statute was passed purporting for the first time to confer the power
in question upon the majority. Therefore, the inquiry must be as to
when unanimous stockholder action may be required for valid exercise of power admittedly within corporate authority at the time of
the exercise, and the problems of ultra vires are clearly collateral.
MAJORITY COMMON LAW AND CHARTER POWER
FOR CORPORATE ACTION

Clearly the problem of constitutional limitation upon the power of
majority stockholders to act under newly enacted corporation statutes
is only a part of the general field of corporate action, and discussion
of the problem without relation to its location in the general field
only can lead into confusion. Majority power can be defined only
with relation to the status of the minority stockholders who legally
oppose it. Before discussing legislative power, through increase of
majority power, to change the contract of the minority stockholder
without his consent, it is necessary to fix the time as to which that
contract is to be determined. The issue of change cannot arise except
with reference to statutes becoming effective after such point in time.
When corporate stock is issued, whether at the time of original
organization or later in the corporate history, its purchasers become
parties to the contract of stockholders inter se, entered into under
statutory regulation, subject to the rules of statutory interpretation,
and governing the corporate business organization. 1 The terms of
poration Act," 4 U. of Cinn. L. Rev. 129 (1930). Professor Dodd concluded
that, with certain possible exceptions, the'Ohio act would pass constitutional
tests. However, since constitutionality turns upon the scope given in each state
to legislative power to amend corporate charters, as well as upon the completeness in each state of prior corporation legislation, the problem is individual to
each state.
117 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, Rev. ed. (1931), secs. 3634, 3635; the
provisions of the articles must conform to statutory requirements, and will not
be construed as in conflict with them where a conforming interpretation is
reasonable. Welch v. Land Development Co., 246 Wis. 124, 16 N. W. 2nd.
402 (1944).
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this contract are to be found in the articles of incorporation, and in the
statutory and constitutional law relating to corporations as applied
and interpreted in the particular jurisdiction. Because a part of this
contract, particularly the statutory part, is subject to flux and change,
it becomes necessary in particular cases, with reference to the contracts of particular stockholders before the court, to place the time
in corporate history which should govern their definition. Some
courts have recoiled from the task of re-definition in the case of
each stockholder on the basis of the time he acquired his stock, and
have referred the contract rights of all back to the date of original
corporate organization. 2 Suich an approach appears neither necessary
nor proper. It is submitted that recipients of any issue of stock,
whether at the time of incorporation or later, enter the corporate
contract as parties as of the time of the stock issue; and it appears
that the rights of their later transferees are governed as of the time
of their stock acquisitions.13 The problem is illustrated in the facts
of Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Company.14 In this case the corporation was originally organized in 1903. At this time a unanimous vote
of shareholders was required for any amendment of the articles with
reference to preferred stock.' 5 In 1913 the Legislature amended the
statutes to require a three-fourths vote for such action.16 Plaintiff
sued in 1936 to restrain amendments to the articles designed to affect
materially preferred stock rights which he acquired between 1920
and 1931, and which were issued in a company capital structure
reorganization in 1919. The decision did not question the power
of three-fourths of the shareholders to make amendments, and assumed the applicability to plaintiff's case of the 1913 statute.' 7 The
contest involved solely interpretation of statutes assumed by all parties to be a part of plaintiff's contract. These were not the statutes
in effect at the time the corporation was organized in 1903. Actually
the statutes governing amendments to preferred stock which were
assumed and quoted in the decision as a part of plaintiff's contract
'12Allen v. Francisco Sugar Co., 92 N. J. Eq. 431, 112 A. 887 (1921).

See Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift, 238 Wis. 628, 300 N. W. 760 (1941),
where the court stated at p. 636: "a person acquiring corporate stock consents
in advance (p. 577) to the making of such change in the articles, as the
statutes in effect at the time of such acquisition permit; * * '."Thus, where
statutes enlarging majority corporate power have been passed in the interim,
the transferee of corporate stock acquires different contract rights in the corporation than his transferor had. To the same effect: Kreicker v. Naylor Pipe
Co., 374 Ill.
364, 29 N. E. 2d. 502 (1940).
14228 Wis. 566, 280 N. W. 688 (1938).
5
5 Wis. Stat. (1911), sec. 1759a.
16 Laws of Wis. (1913) Ch. 533.
'17 Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566 at 574, 280 N. W. 688 (1938),
where, after quoting Wis. Stat., Secs. 180.07 (1), and 182.13, the court stated:
"These statutes are as effectively a part of the plaintiff's certificates of stock
and of the corporate charter as though printed therein."
13
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were the statutes in effect at the time of suit, and which had been
last amended in 1927.18 Since these statutes were different than those
of 1919, it cannot be said the court selected the time the stock was
originally issued as determining plaintiff's contract rights. He purchased preferred stock both before and after 1927, so it cannot be
said his contract rights were determined strictly as of the time of his
stock acquisitions. To read into plaintiff's contract without his consent
statutes enacted after he acquired his stock is to raise the constitutional
issue later to be discussed. It was done in this case at least as to
a part of plaintiff's stock, but that it can be done over objection
and where rights of plaintiff are materially affected thereby is not
the decision of the case. 9 The amendments made to Section 182.13
of 1925 and 1927, and of 1927 to Section 180.07(1) were apparently
not such as to affect the rights of plaintiff here, and the case was
argued and decided on the theory that the statute as amended in
20
1927 governed the case and was a part of plaintiff's contract.
Assuming the contract of the dissenting stockholder is to be determined as of the time of his stock acquisition, what is the amending power of the majority with reference to it? The inquiry leads
to the articles of incorporation and corporate legislation in effect
at that time.
Analogy to partnership law might dictate that unanimous consent
2
of all is required for any change in the contract of any member. 1
However this was hardly true of corporations even before it was
common practice to include in the statutes provisions expressly reserving amending power to the majority. In the absence of such
provisions the courts implied from the stockholders' contract a so
called "common law" majority power to amend in good faith and
for purposes reasonably calculated to meet genuine business de's Wis. Stat. (1943), secs. 180.07 (1) and 182.13. Sec. 180.07 (1) was amended by
Laws of Wis. (1927), Ch. 534, sec. 7; and sec. 182.13 was amended by Laws of
Wis. (1925), Ch. 324, and Laws of Wis. (1927), Ch. 534, Sec. 52.
19 The language of the opinion proceeds on the theory of determination as of the
time plaintiff acquired his stock. At page 575 the court said: "In the instant
case, at the time plaintiff purchased his stock from the defendant company, the
right to amend the articles of incorporation was reserved both by the articles of
organization and the statutes above quoted, a method of amendment being provided by both."
20 Appellant's brief in the Supreme Court, January Term (1938), No. 103, at pp.
22-24, quotes and discusses Sections 180.07 (1) and 182.13, Wis. Stat., as they
stood after the 1927 amendments. The statutes as they were written prior to
that time do not appear in the briefs. Had it been true that reference to the
statutes in effect between 1920 and 1927 would have narrowed the majority
amending power and bettered plaintiff's position before the court, it certainly
may be assumed plaintiff's attorneys would have pressed the point.
21 Today differences "arising as to ordinary matters connected with the partnership business" have been made subject to the rule of majority control by statute
in many states. See Uniform Partnership Act, sec. 18 (h) ; Wis. Stat., (1943),
sec. 123.15 (8).
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velopmental need. Such power is illogical and inconsistent with
partnership and contract law, but multiplicity of parties and other
differences between the contract of corporate business organization
and the partnership and other contracts seem more than sufficient
to have justified the fiction. It was usually expressed negatively as
denying majority power to make "fundamental or radical changes
in the purposes of the corporation", and the limits of the power were
ascertained in each case by striking a balance between business
necessity and equitable treatment of the stockholder2 Cases defining the power usually arose in connection with major changes in
business policy; for instance the sale or mortgage of all corporate
assets, 23 or change and extension of railroad routes.?

The courts

applied the doctrine conservatively, and its growth has come practically to a halt due to universal enactment of statutes expressly
reserving and defining majority amending power. This common law
power no doubt still will be recognized, even independently of the
statutory power, where the precise "common law" precedents are pro2 5
duced to support it.

For the purpose of this article suffice it to say that under the
doctrine, changes amounting to consolidation or merger were generally held invalid as fundamental changes. 26 In such cases consolidation
22

Martin Orchard Co. v. Fruit Growers C. Co., 203 Wis. 97, 233 N. W. 603
(1930), involving majority power to mortgage all the corporate assets and assume a large debt. The Court stated at p. 103, "This appeal resolves itself into
a question of the proper application of these principles to the facts of the case.
Did the operations objected to constitute a fundamental and radical change in
the corporate activities?" See 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations, 2d. ed. (1886),
secs. 395, 402, 403; a few cases rejected the doctrine and required unanimous

stockholder consent for any change, Zabriskie v. Hackensack, etc. R. R., 18

N. J. Eq. 178 (1867).

23 Supra, note 22. 6 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed., sec. 2946, 2947

(1931); 13 ibid., sec. 5798; 15 ibid., sec. 7216; Hill v. Page and Hill Co., 198
Minn. 30, 268 N. W. 705 (1936), noted in 35 Mich. L. Rev. 626 (1937).
24 Snook v. Georgia Imp. Co., 83 Ga. 61, 9 S. E. 1104 (1889); Banet v. Alton and
Sangamon R. R., 13 Ill. 504 (1851); Milford and Chillicothe Turnpike Co. v.
Brush, 10 Ohio 111 (1840) ; Lynch v. Eastern, LaFayette and Mississippi Ry.
Co., 57 Wis. 430 (1883).

25 Martin Orchard Co. v. Fruit Growers C. Co., 203 Wis. 97, 233 N. W. 603
(1930), where the Court stated at p. 102: "The common law governing this
controversy is not seriously in dispute. It is clear that a fundamental or radical
change in the'purposes of a corporation cannot be accomplished by amendment
over the dissent of a single stockholder. * * * It is equally clear that nonfundamental or immaterial changes may be made by the ordinary procedure of
amendment. * * * The defendants contend that sec. 180.07 (1), Stats., has
changed this rule. This section provides: * * * Since the application of the com-

mon-law rule above stated to the facts of this case compels a conclusion favorable to the defendants, we have not found it necessary to pass upon, and do not

pass upon, the effect of this section."

Morawetz, Private Corporations, 2d. ed. (1886), sec. 396. McCray v. Junction
R. R.. 9 Ind. 358 (1857) ; Shelbyville & R. Turnpike Co. v. Barnes, 42 Ind. 498
(1873); New Orleans J. & G. N. R. R. v. Harris, 27 Miss. 517 (1854) ; Lauman
v. Lebanon Valley R. R., 30 Pa. 42 (1858) ; Noesen v. Town of Port Washing-

261

ton, 37 Wis. 168 (1875).
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was urged as non-fundamental in character, and thus within the
fictional contemplation of the stockholder, even though not authorized
by statutes in effect when he acquired his stock. It must be understood
that such organic changes as consolidation are not within corporate
authority at all, are ultra vires, unless made pursuant to express
statutory authority. 27 Had such changes been construed as nonfundamental, this doctrine would have subjected the stockholder to
majority power to consolidate pursuant to statutes subsequently enacted
on the theory that he consented to it in his original contract. Thus
the constitutional objection against retroactive legislation changing
his contract could have been neatly shelved. However the general
rule of decision was that such changes were fundamental and amounted
to a change in the original contract.
Dictum in one early case made the question a doubtful one in
Wisconsin ;28 but decisions in later cases quite clearly deny the common
law power of non-fundamental change as sufficiently broad to include
such things as consolidation, merger, and reorganization in general. 29
The Court referred to this question in State ex rel. Cleary v. Hopkins
Street B. & L. Association,0 which involved several cases arising
from an action by the State Banking Commission to restrain and
nullify action by defendant, a Wisconsin building and loan association, to become a Federal Savings and Loan Association under a
federal act permitting a state association to do so upon a vote of
fifty-one per cent of its stockholders. The federal act referred to the
process as "conversion"; but it is submitted more orthodox terminology
would label it merger, consolidation, or just reorganization, depending
upon the resulting legal effect. The state statutes governing defendant's
corporate existence and organization had at no time relevant to the
controversy made provision for such conversion, merger or consolidation with a corporation of a foreign jurisdiction; and the court
27

15 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations. perm. ed. (1931), sec. 7048.

28 Kenosha, Rockford and Pock Island Rd. Co. v. Marsh. 17 Wis. 13 (1863),

where the Court stated, "The Supreme Court of Indiana has recently held that
the mere consolidation with another company under an act of the legislature
releases nonassenting subscribers. * * * I should not wish to adopt that conclusion without further examination." The Court in this case was thinking
primarily of changes in railroad routes, and it is clear from its discussion it did
not consider the effect of "mere" consolidation, where a subscriber to stock in
the X-Corporation comes out with stock in the Y-Corporation. It is certainly
difficult to justify his "assent" to such a result solely on the basis of the implied
common law majority amending power.
29 Noesen v. Town of Port Washington, 37 Wis. 168 (1875), holding a dissenting
stock subscriber cannot be held to have contemplated consolidation upon acquiring his interest, where there were no state statutes at the time authorizing
it. See also Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 105 N. W. 1031, 1135 (1906) ; 132
Wis. 86, 111 N. W. 1107 (1907).
30217 Wis. 179, 257 N. W. 684 (1935), aff'd. 296 U. S. 315, 80 L. ed. 251, 56 S. Ct.
235 (1935) ; see also First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Loomis, 97 F. 2d.
831 (C. C. A. 7, 1938).
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held such action ultra vires, beyond all corporate authority, majority
or unanimous. It is implicit in the decision that any objecting stockholder could have enjoined the action had the Bariking Commission
not stepped in. The court said:31
"Their charters do not authorize them to divest themselves
of the corporate charter conferred upon them by the laws of
the state. They have only the powers emanating from the state.
These powers must be used as prescribed by the state and
with due consideration for the contractual rights between the
stockholders and the corporation existing by reason of state
law and the charter of the corporation. Under the declared
law of the state, we are bound to hold that a corporation
organized under our general incorporation laws has not the
power to divest itself of the corporate character derived from
this sovereign state by accepting a charter from any other
sovereign government."
The Court further stated such action to be beyond the "common
law" power to effect non-fundamental changes .2
"A fundamental and radical change in the purpose of a
corporation cannot be accomplished by an act of the corporation
over the dissent of a single stockholder.*** And there is a
fundamental and material difference between being a member
of a building and loan association over which the representatives
chosen by the people of this state have the reserve power of
control and being a member of one created by the legislative
body of a different sovereign power."
By implication, even if there had been a state statute granting.
corporate authority to act under the federal act, such authority
could not have been exercised against the dissent of stockholders
who acquired their stock before such state statute became effective.
Under the common law doctrine they acquired their stock solely
subject to majority power to effect non-fundamental changes.
Most modern corporation statutory systems contain sections expressly conferring upon majority stockholders powers of amendment."
The scope of such statutory power basically is a matter of interpretation, and because the amending sections vary from state to state
the scope of the power is a problem peculiar to each jurisdiction. 34
31Ibid. p. 185.
32 Ibid. p. 190.
337

Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, Rev. ed. (1931), sec. 3717.

34 Ibid. sec. 3718: "The extent of the power to amend thus conferred upon the

corporation, its officers or members depends upon the terms of the statute, and
it can only be exercised within the limitations and subject to the conditions

thereby imposed. Usually an amendment may be adopted if it contains provisions which might have been inserted in the original charter, * * *."The Court
in Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N. W. 688 (1938), stated
at p. 580: "Counsel have cited many cases relating to corporate amendments
under general common-law rules; also cases where the amendments were
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Stock is received subject to the corporate contract, and inclusion
therein of a general amending power interpreted so broadly as to
permit the majority to do anything within its desire is not inconceivable. The ultimate would be interpretation authorizing majority action under any legislative action of the indefinite future.
Such interpretation would define the stockholder's contract as of
the time of, suit, and would eliminate all constitutional questions, except, possibly, due process. It would award the majority the utmost
in corporate flexibility and freedom of action, but would place the
minority stockholder at the complete mercy of the majority and
whim of the legislature. An interpretation so destructive of the
security of stock investment and the private interest of the minority
stockholder is not to be expected or desired. It has not been the
interpretation of the past.35 Past interpretation has presented an
equitable balance between the interest of the majority in regulation
of the business organization in harmony with competitive business
need and minority interest in majority good faith and reasonable
conduct, and in maintaining the security and integrity of its investment.
The majority interest is further weighted by the public interest in
efficient and workable corporate organization. The inquiry concerns
the meaning of a contract controlled by statute. The language of
decision is that of interpretation to a considerable extent of legislative words, with an eye to determine the impression reasonably
to be conveyed by them to the mind of an investor. Will the
scrutiny of equity determine he agreed to such action affecting his
interest as has been exercised by the majority ?36
made under statutory provisions. In the latter class, the decisions are based
upon statutory construction and are not particularly helpful because of the
difference in the statutory law of the different jurisdictions."
3 See Lattin, "Equitable Limitations on Statutory or Charter Powers given to
Majority Stockholders," 30 Mich. L. Rev. 645 (1932); American Seating Co.
v. Bifllard, (C.C.A. 6th, 1923) 290 F. 896; Koehler v. St. Mary's Brewing Co.,
228 Pa. 648, 66 A. 1016 (1910).
36 Sellers v. Joseph Bancroft & Sons Co., 23 Del. Ch. 13, 2 A. 2d. 108 (1938);
Traer v. Lucas Prospecting Co.. 124 I,.107. 99 N. \W. 290 (1904) ; United
Order of Foresters v. Miller, 178 Wis. 299, 190 N. W. 197 (1922) ; Wisconsin
T.M.R. Co. v. Calumet C. MI. ins. Co., 224 Wis. 109, 271 N. W. 51 (1937);
Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 149 N. W. 754 (1915); in
Milwaukee S,-nitorium v. Swift, 238 Vis. 628, 300 N. W. 760 (1941), plaintiff
complained of majority action which did not recognize her claimed pre-emotive
right to shares. The Court stated at p. 636: "We think it clear that in a business such as respondent's, with its success so dependent upon the character,
ability, and reputation of the personnel of its staff, it may be just as necessary,
and under certain circumstances even more necessary, in the interest of its
stockholders, to issue stock in order to procure services."
"However, the question under consideration is no longer an open one in
Wisconsin. The right of the stockholders in good faith to so amend its articles
is definitely settled by the holding of this court in Johnson v. Bradley Knitting
Co., supra. It is there held that a corporation may amend its articles in any

CORPORATION STATUTES

The Wisconsin section conferring majority amending power reads
as follows .3
"Any corporation organized for any of the purposes authorized by this chapter, may, by a vote of two-thirds of all the
stock outstanding, and entitled to vote,*** unless a greater vote
shall be required in its articles, amend its articles so as to
modify or enlarge its business or purposes, change its name
or location, increase or diminish its capital stock, change its
officers or its directors, or provide anything which might have
been originally provided in such articles, but no corporation
without stock shall change substantially the original purposes
of its organization."
In Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Company and other recent cases,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court has indicated a disposition to give

this section, limited and controlled by Section 182.13 as to preferred
stock, a broad interpretation consistent with public interest in majority power to make necessary changes.38 But no doubt there is
a point, to be measured in terms of unfair and arbitrary action
beyond which the majority may not go, and as to which it may
respect which might have been originally provided in its articles, subject, of
course, to the required statutory vote."
"It was further held (p. 574) that the statutes authorizing a corporation to
amend its articles of incorporation are as effectively a part of certificates of
stock issued thereby and of the corporate charter as though printed therein;
and a person acquiring corporate stock consents in advance (p. 577) to the
making of such change in the articles, as the statutes in effect at the time of
such acquisition permit; and an exercise of the right by the state or by a prescribed majority of the stockholders of the corporation is neither an impairment nor a breach of the contract of such stockholder."
87 Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 180.07.
8Sjohnston v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N. W. 688, 117 A.L.R.
1276 (1938), noted in 1943 Wis. L. Rev. 417, 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 65 at 66. This
case does not by any means hold, as was intimated in 1944 Wis. L. Rev. 65 at
70, "that the requisite statutory majority can amend a corporation's charter in
almost any respect." It held only that the changes made in this case with reference to preferred stock were within majority power under section 180.07, and
section 182.13, which deals specifically with preferred stock and its preferences, and the amendments made were upheld because they were such as might
have been provided in the original articles. At page 579 the Court stated: "In
the case at bar, the incidents of the preferred stock changed by amendment
were * * * the ordinary preferences provided by the articles and authorized by
sec. 182.13." Obviously this does not justify a conclusion that, for instance, the
majority could by amendment provide for cumulative voting, or merger with
another corporation. The statutes, sec. 182.13, deal specifically with preferred
stock and its preferences. They do not mention or authorize cumulative voting
or merger. And in the absence of express statutory authority, consolidation
and merger, and apparently cumulative voting, are beyond corporate power.
15 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed. (1931), sec. 7048; 5 Ibid., sec.
2048; 18 Op. Atty. Gen. (Wis. 1929), p. 429. See also Milwaukee Sanitarium v.
Lynch, '238 Wis. 628, 300 N. W. 760 (1941); Hull v. Pfister & Vogel Leather
Co., 235 Wis. 653, 294 N. W. 18 (1940) ; 31 Atty. Gen. (Wis. 1942), p. 354; for
other discussions of the Bradley Knitting case, see Nemmers, "CorporationsAccrued Preferred Dividends in Wisconsin," 1943 Wis. L. R. 417; Hale, "The
Work of the Wisconsin Supreme Court: Business Associations," 1944 Wis.
L. R. 64.
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be decided the minority never agreed upon its purchase of stock.
Past accrued dividends do not appear to have been destroyed in
the Bradley Knitting case, and it cannot be said from this decision
that majority action can destroy them in Wisconsin. Plaintiff had
a claim to $35 per share of accrued but undeclared dividends. The
stockholders authorized a dividend of $20, and this was offered in
dividend warrants. The Court held plaintiff could have his $20 in
cash, making no decision as to the remaining $15 in undeclared
accrued dividends. The decision further refused relief against amendments in relation to preferred stock preferences which reduced the
future dividend rate, changed the ratio of quick net assets to outstanding stock, and reduced the required percentage of profits for
the sinking fund. The decision went a long way, but it did not go all
the way by any means; and it permitted the changes only with
reference to the business exigencies of the particular situation.
Such analysis perhaps suggests there is no problem concerning
majority power to act under retroactive legislation. If such legislation is reasonable and does not unduly destroy "vested" interests, it
may be interpreted as within majority power where exercised in
good faith, regardless of the subject matter concerned. That this is
not a safe conclusion is evident upon consideration of powers and
procedures clearly not authorized under a particular corporate statutory system. 39 The Bradley Knitting case involved preferences of
preferred stock, a matter concerning which majority power was
39

Cases in which action under a statute, effective after the complaining stockholder acquired his stock, has been sustained expressly on the ground that such
action was within original majority amending power are not numerous. In
Wright v. Minnesota Mutual Life Ins. Co., 193 U. S. 657 (1904), plaintiff became a member of an insurance company organized on the assessment plan in
1892. The majority, pursuant to a Minnesota statute of 1901, changed to the
regular premium basis, and plaintiff brought a bill asking dissolution on the
theory the corporate contract had been impaired by action under the legislation.
The Court held the change within the power of the majority under the original
charter, stating at page 665: "The argument for appellants is that, having begun as an assessment company, the plan can never be changed without the consent of all interested. But we have seen that the right of amendment was given
in the original articles of association. There was no contract that the plan of
insurance should never be changed. On the contrary, it was recognized that
amendments might be necessary. There was no vested right to a continuation
of a plan of insurance which experience might demonstrate would result disastrously to the company and its members. We are cited to the statutes of
many states authorizing similar changes and transfer of membership, but to
no case holding legislative authorization of a change of this character to work
the impairment by the State of the obligation of a contract." See also Kreicker
v. Naylor Pipe Co., 374 Ill. 364, 29 N. E. 2d. 502 (1940), noted in 8 U. of Chic.
L. Rev. 134 (1940), where amendments affecting plaintiff's preferred stock were
made in 1936 under majority power conferred in the 1933 Illinois Business
Corporations Act. Plaintiff acquired his stock in 1930, and the corporation had
been formed under the 1919 General Corporation Act. The court stated at page
507: "The corporation had the statutory power under the 1919 act to amend its
articles of incorporation in the manner it did, and by appellant's acceptance of
the stock, he agreed to be bound * * *"
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spelled out in Section 182.13, a part of the stockholders' contract.

In Wisconsin such matters as cumulative voting, merger and consolidation are nowhere spelled out in or apparently to be implied
from the business corporation statutes.40 Beyond doubt majority
40 15 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, Rep. Vol. (1938), sec. 7048; 2 Morawetz,

Private Corporations, 2d. ed., sec. 940 (1886); statutory consolidation and
merger is authorized by Wis. Stat. (1945), sec. 181.07, newly created by Laws of
Wis. (1945), Ch. 48, but for nonstock corporations only. It has been held that
cooperative associations organized under Wis. Stat. (1943), Ch. 185, have the
power of consolidation and merger through sale of assets to a new corporation
in exchange for its stock under section 185.12, which gives an association power
to "purchase the business of another corporation" and to "pay for the same
* * * by issuing to the selling corporation * * * shares of * * * stock." Pearson
v. Clam Falls Co-op Dairy Asso., 243 Wis. 369, 10 N. W. 2d. 132 (1943). Some
results may be achieved by business stock corporations under section 182.01
(10), empowering corporations to acquire and hold stock in other corporations, through the use of variations of the holding company device. See Hoberg
v. John Hoberg Co., 170 Wis. 50, 173 N. W. 639 (1919). This power, coupled
with power under section 180.11 (2), to "sell * * * all * * * of the property
owned by it * * * whenever it shall become necessary for its business" may give
power through sale of assets in exchange for stock to effect what amounts to
a consolidation or merger, when the power of dissolution is exercised in addition. See McDermott v. O'Neill Oil Co., 200 Wis. 423, 228 N. W. 481 (1930).
Such procedure does not amount to the same thing as consolidation or merger
under modern statutes roughly requiring only corporate action on agreements
by the corporations involved, and proper filing of the same. Illinois Rev. Stat.
(State Bar Asso. ed. 1945), Ch. 32, secs. 157.61-157.69. The sale procedure is
much more complex, involving numerous transfers of property, much corporate action, and often dissolution proceeding. It is more expensive and the
possibility of error, and unexpected liability incurred by those involved, is

much greater. But the simplified procedure for consolidation and merger is
lacking in the Wisconsin statutes, except as to nonstock corporations, and
certainly can nowhere be implied. Query whether section 180.11(2) is sufficiently broad to authorize consolidation by sale of assets on the part of a
going concern to another corporation for its stock. There was no such power
at common law, and this being true, statutes like section 180.11(2) simply
authorizing sale of all assets may be construed strictly to include only cases
where sale and dissolution are required by business exigencies, denying the
power to going concerns, and denying the power to sell for stock, as at common law. Certainly no intention to override the common law is apparent in
section 180.11(2), even taken in connection with section 182.01(10). See 6
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed. (1931), sec. 2946, 2947; 13 Ibid.,
sec. 5798; 15 Ibid., rep. vol. (1938), (sec. 7054, 7216; Warren, "Voluntary
Transfers of Corporate Undertakings," 30 Harv. L. Rev. 335 (1917) ; Hills,
"Consolidqtion of Corpor.-tions by Sale of Assets and Distribution of Shares,"
19 Calif. L. Rev. 349 at 352 (1931) ; American Seating Co. v. Bullard, (C.C.A.
6th, 1923), 290 F. 896. Statutes in other states grant clear authority to a going
concern to sell all assets in exchange for stock in another corporation, and are
much more explicit than in section 180.11(2). See Illinois Rev. Stat. (State
Bar Asso. ed. 1945), Ch. 32, secs. 157.71, 157.72. McDermott v. O'Neill Oil Co.,
supra, is not clear authority for a going concern because the power was not
questioned. the Court considering only the question of good faith in the exercise. and the corporation involved was contemplating dissolution, placing the
case within the "exigencies of the business" doctrine at common law. Consolidation of church corporations is provided for in Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 187.14.
For general authority that no consolidation is possible in absence of legislative
sanction, see St. Thomas Gemeinde v. St. Matthews Church, 191 Wis. 340,
210 N.W. 942 (1926), involving two church corporations. With reference to insurance corporations see Union Indemnity Co. v. Smith, 181 Wis. 528, 205 N.W.
492 (1925). See also Wegner v. Sheboygan-Elkhart Lake R. &E. Co., 171 Wis.
325, 176 N.W. 865 (1920); Pennison v. The Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R.
Co., 93 Wis. 344, 67 N.W. 702 (1896). For authority with reference to cumulative voting see 18 Op. Atty. Gen. (Wis. 1929), p. 429; 5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia
Corporations, perm. ed., sec. 2048 (1931).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

action to impose such procedure upon an objecting minority could
not be sustained under the present statutes. Such majority power can
arise only from subsequent legislation, imposing a change upon the
contract of the stockholder who previously acquired his stock. 41 Such

legislation may be written in language of compulsion, making it,
as of its effective date, a part of corporate contracts generally. It
may be written in a permissive style, awarding the corporation an
option through majority action to write it in the articles. 42 In either
event the result is the same. Majority action subjects the objecting
stockholder to something which was beyond majority power when he
bought his stock. The compulsion in the permissive statute lies in
the substitution of the rule of majority for that of unanimous action.
Such statutes reside in the constitutional comer of the general field
of majority corporate action.
LEGISLATIVE POWER TO INCREASE MAJORITY POWER
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
When the desired action happens to be beyond majority power
for corporate action, either expressly reserved by statute or implied
from common law, then the last resort must be to a retroactive

enabling statute from the legislature. The constitutional problems presented by such legislation have required judicial interpretation of the
impairment of contract clauses in the federal4 3 and state 44 constitutions,
and of the clauses in state statutes and constitutions 5 reserving to

the legislatures power to alter, amend and repeal corporate charters.
The latter clauses were made necessary by the decision in the Dartmouth College case. 46 Although the language of the cases has been
largely of the reserved power to alter and amend, parallels have
been drawn to the police power of the state as limited by due
47
process.
43 See supra, note 29, for authority that action under legislation authorizing consolidation or merger cannot be construed as within the stockholder's contract
under the common law doctrine of non-fundamental changes.
427 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed., sec. 3717 (1931).
43 Unitcd States Constitution, Art. 1, Sec. 10: "No state shall *** pass any ***
law impairing the obligation of contracts, * *"
44Wis. Const., Art. 1, Sec. 12: "No * * * law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall ever be passed, * * *"
45 Wis. Const., Art. XI, Sec. 1: "Corporations without banking powers or privileges may be formed under -eneral law's. but shall not be created by special
act, except for municipal purposes, and in cases where, in the judgment of
the legislature, the objects of the corporation cannot be attained under general
laws. All general laws or special acts enacted under the provisions of this section may be altered or repealed by the legislature at any time after their passage." 7 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, per ed., sec. 3668 (1931).
46 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U.S.) 518 (1819).
47 See generally, Dodd, "Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate
Charters," 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 585, 723 (1927); Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 Mich. L. Rev. 743
(1934).
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The profession is fully acquainted with the Dartmouth College case
and its implications. The case held the relation between corporation
and state to be that of contract within the meaning of the constitutional
prohibition against impairment of contracts, and unquestionably in
that day grants of land and other wh-olly executed transactions were
classified in the field of contract. 4 The conclusion was not altogether
unnatural in an age in which corporate charters were acquired by
special concession from the sovereign, but it does appear anomalous
today to one who views a corporate charter more as a contract between a group of people desiring to associate together in a business
enterprise which is entered into, subject to, and in accordance with
the requirements of general corporation statutes.49 And the conclusion was necessary to the decision made, because due process was
not available as a limitation upon arbitrary state legislation until after
the effective date of the Fourteenth Amendment. 0 When that date
arrived the doctrine of the Dartmouth College case already was
deeply embedded in the law.
The result of historical evolution has been that legislative power
over private property and contract interests generally has been defined in terms of state police power as limited by due process of law,
and as to contracts also by the prohibition against their impairment,
while virtually the same power of control over corporate organization has been defined in terms of the reserved power to alter and
amend. In consequence judicial delimitation of the scope of the police
power as such has not developed in the corporate direction. It
has been extensively defined by the courts so far as its exercise
in matters of public health, safety, and morals is concerned; but
it has been only during the economic crises of the recent past that
judicial definition of its scope and application to private contracts
has commenced. 51 It has been contended by some that definition of
In Fletcher v. Peck, 6 Cranch 87 (1810, the Court had held a legislative land
grant to fall within the protection of the prohibition against impairment of
contracts.
49 Berle, Studies in the Law of Corporation Finance, Ch. I; 1 Machen, Modern
Law of Corporations (1908), secs. 1, 19, 20. The contract between the stockholders inter se was not before the Court in the Dartmouth College case because the College was a charitable and educational institution, and did not have
members in the sense that a business corporation has stockholders. In essence
the case ;nvolved a quarrel between the state and the corporation as an entity,
5o United States Constitution, Amendment Fourteen, which became effective in
48

1868.

5sManigault v. Springs, 199 U. S. 473, 26 S. Ct. 127 (1905); Marcus Brown
Holding Company v. Feldman, 256 U. S. 170, 41 S. Ct. 465 (1921); Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel. 258 U. S.242. 42 S.Ct. 289 (1922); Home Building and Loan
Association v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398. 54 S. Ct. 231 (1934); Veix v. Sixth
Ward Association, 310 U. S.32 at 38-39, 60 S.Ct. 792 (1940), where Justice
Reed, speaking of the police power of tbe state. stated: "Such authority is not
limited to health, morals and safety. It extends to economic needs as well."
And at page 40, "This power of the State to protect its citizens by statutory
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legislative power over the corporation in terms of the reserved power
should be halted, and definition begun anew in terms of the police
power.5" However such re-definition is hardly to be expected at
this late date in the face of the long line of decisions interpreting the
reserved power on the one hand, and the existing uncertainty as to
the limits of the police power as such when applied to corporate
organization on the other.
One might ask what difference it makes whether legislative power
is defined in terms of police power or of the reserved power to
amend, if there is no difference in kind between them. The answer
is that because of the different specific sources of power, there have
developed variations of degree in interpretation. In the majority of
states and in the federal courts the reserved power has been broadly
defined somewhat in step with the development of the police power
in other fields. But in a small minority of states, including Wisconsin,
under the spell of old decisions, the reserved power is narrowly defined as limited to the so-called contract relation between corporation
and state, and as not sufficiently wide in scope to permit legislative
change to the contract of stockholders inter se, through increase of
majority power thereunder.
One more point will be raised before considering specifically the
two views which have developed concerning the scope of the reserved
power. It concerns the finality in the federal courts of a state court
decision affirming the restricted view of the reserved power in favor
of a dissenting stockholder. The Wisconsin Constitution contains a
prohibition against legislative impairment of contracts as well as a
reserved power to alter general corporation laws; and the Wisconsin
Supreme Court decision, if based wholly upon construction of these
provisions, will be followed in the federal courts unless the construction violates a federally protected right.53 And certainly the
dissenting stockholder who wins his case will not complain for lack
of due process. The state court should be free to place its own construction upon the prohibition against impairment of contracts conenactments affecting contract rights, without violation of the contract clause of
the Constitution, is analogous to the power often reserved to amend charters."
See also, Mutual Building and Savings Association v. Willing, 221 Wis. 563,
267 N.W. 297 (1936).
52 Doe, "A New View of the Dartmouth College Case," 6 Harv. L. Rev. 161
(1893), and Judge Doe's opinion in Dow v. Northern R.R., 67 N.H. 1, 36 A.
510 (1887), in which it is contended that the situation which would have existed
had the Dartmouth College case been decided the other way should be restored. See also Huber v. Martin, 127 Wis. 412, 105 N.W. 1031 (1906), where
the court decides the case on tho basis of the police power as limited by due
process and the prohibition against impairment of contracts, without mention
of the reserved power.
53 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S. Ct. 817 (1938) ; Hottenstein v. York
Ice Machine Co., (C.C.A. 3d. 1943), 136 F. 2d. 944; Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., (D. C. Del. 1944), 53 F. Supp. 198.

CORPORATION STATUTES

tained in the state constitution so long as such construction is no
broader that that of the United States Supreme Court under the
similar provision in the Federal Constitution. It will be observed that
the cases placing a narrow scope upon legislative power under the
reserved power to amend do so as a matter of construction of the
reserved power clause alone. It does not follow that a broader scope
could not have been given without running afoul of the prohibition
against contract impairment in the Federal Constitution."
SCOPE OF THE RESERVED POWER THE Two VIEws
On the facts of the Dartmouth College case the Court was concerned with the relation between the state and the corporation viewed
as an entity. It was not concerned in that case with the contract
relations among the stockholders within the corporation. The Court
labelled the former relation a contract, and Justice Story stated, "if
the legislature mean to claim such authority." (to amend the charter)
"it must be reserved in the grant". 55 Subsequently all the states reserved the power suggested by Justice Story, either in their constitutions or statutes, and in many cases it was included in special
charters. Reflecting the trend away from special charters, most of
the state provisions took the form of reservations to amend or alter
the general corporation laws.56
Of course these reservations became a part of the contract of
every stockholder acquiring his stock after their effective dates, but
their meaning in the contracts depended upon the scope given the
power in the judicial decisions interpreting it. In the light of their
history the reservations naturally were interpreted to authorize legislative action as to matters commonly understood to be involved in
the relation between corporation and state. Obviously they authorized
police regulations concerning corporate conduct with relation to outsiders. Such regulations fell naturally into the Dartmouth College fact
situation. The confusion arose when statutes were considered which
changed the contract relations of the stockholders inter se by awarding
greater powers to the majority group. The facts in the Dartmouth
College case afforded no clear precedent for a decision on these facts.
Was such legislation included in the scope of the reserved power to
amend, or was it unconstitutional as an impairment of private contract rights? If it would have been invalid if retroactively applied
to partnership contracts, did the reserved power save it when applied
to corporations? A liberal view saw in the reserved power a special

See the discussion of this point in Dodd, "Dissenting Stockholders and Amendments to Corporate Charters," 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 585, 723 at 738-742 (1927).
55 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 518 at 712 (1819).
56 7 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed., secs. 3668-3672 (1931).
54
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type of police power, operative upon the stockholder contract inter se,
and justifiable on the basis of obvious factual differences between
it and ordinary contracts. The narrow view restricted the scope of
the power to cases falling within the facts of its origin.
Legislation exercising the taxing or police powers with reference
to the relation between the corporation as an entity and the state
or the outside public was generally considered by all courts as falling
within the scope of the reserved power.5 7 It was recognized that such
legislation had at least an incidental effect upon the private interest
of the stockholders and thus upon their contract, but it did not increase majority power as against the minority and the incidental
effect was brushed aside by the cases.58 The problem of determining
whether certain legislation affected the contract of stockholders as
well as the contract between corporation and state was inescapeable
if the artificial distinction between the two contracts was to be maintained. A small minority of states solved it by restricting the scope
of -the reserved power to legislation affecting only the relation between the corporation as an entity and the state or public, and
denying any legislative power to change the contract of the stockholders inter se by authorizing increase of majority power under it.J9
57Wi.scons*n Telenhone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 206 Wis. 589, 240
N.W. 411 (1932), sustaining, under the reserved power, a statute imposing
upon public utilities the expense of state regulation. Attorney General v.
Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425 (1874), where the court upheld the power of
the state to prescribe maximum rates for passengers and freight. West Wisconsin R.R. Co. v. Board of Supervisors of Trempealeau Co., 35 Wis. 257
(1874), where the Court upheld legislative power to repeal a tax exemption
granted by prior statutes. State ex rel. Martin v. Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 300 N.W.
187 (1941).
58 This difficulty was discussed briefly in two early cases in Wisconsin. In Attorney General v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425 (1874), which involved legislation fixing maximum railroad rates, the court said at pages 578-579: "Of the
same type is the argument that ch. 273 violates the contracts of these defendants with their creditors. This position appears to us to rest in the absurdity
that the mortgagor can vest in his mortgage a greater estate than he had himself.
Perhaps the statute may lessen the means of payment of the defendants. So
would a fine for homicide, under the police power of the state. But to lessen the
means of payment of a contract, is not to impair the obligation of the contract.
These defendants took their franchises, and their creditors invested their
money, subject to the reserved power, and suffer no legal wrong when it is
exercised." And in West Wisconsin R.R. Co. v. Board of Supervisors of
Trempealeau Co., 35 Wis. 257 (1874), concerning a statute repealing a corporate tax exemption, the Court said at page 271: "The original corporators, or
subsequent stockholders, or bondholders, took their interests with knowledge
of the existence of this reserved right on the part of the state of repealing
the exemption acts, * * *"
59 1 Morawetz, Private Corporations, 2d ed., secs 404, 406 (1886) ; Allen v.
Francisco Sugar Co.. 92 N.J.Eq. 431, 112 A. 887 (1921) ; Dow v. Northern R.R.,
67 N.T-T. 1. 36 A. 510 (1887) ; Avondale Land Co. v. Shook, 170 Ala. 379, 54
So. 268 (1911) ; Garey v. St. Joe Mining Co., 32 Utah 497, 91 Pac. 369 (1907) ;
Snook v. Georgia Improvement Co., 83 Gi. 61. 9 S.E. 1104 (1889); Atlanta
Steel Co. v. Mynahan, 138 Ga. 668. 75 S.E. 980 (1912) ; Yoakum v. Providence
Biltmore ITotel Co., 34 F. 2d. 533 (1929) ; query as to Minnesota, see Mower
v. Staples, 32 Minn. 284, 20 N.W. 225(1884) ; Midland Co-operative Wholesale
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This view was followed in the decade of the eighteen sixties by the
courts of three states.60 Wisconsin was one of these, and its cases
will be considered separately in the next section. It has become known
as the New Jersey view, although some of the New Jersey cases quite
clearly depart from it.61 The view in effect denies any real operative
effect to the reserved power, since the legislature possesses the taxing
and police powers independently of the reserved power. It denies to
the legislature any more power to change the contract of the stockholders than it has to change the contract of partners or private contracts generally. The power of the majority to take corporate action may not be increased by statute.
The majority view, named for the Delaware cases and followed
in the federal courts as well, holds that the reserved power authorizes
legislative change to the contract of stockholders inter se. The purchaser of stock contracts with reference to legislative power to in62
crease majority power for corporate action by retroactive statute.
Logical development of this view places no limit upon legislative
power over the contract of stockholders, because no stockholder's
right logically can become vested against the reserved power. 63 However, equitable limitations upon legislative power to affect stockholder
interests were born almost with the doctrine. The limitations placed
have been said to parallel due process, 64 but the language of limitation
is not exactly that of due process. In Looker v. Maynard65 the Supreme
Court upheld retroactive legislation authorizing cumulative voting. The
Court stated the limitations upon legislative reserved power to amend
as follows :66
"The effect of such a provision, whether contained in an
original act of incorporation, or in a constitution or general
v. Range Co-operative Oil Ass'n., 200 Minn. 538, 274 N.W. 624 (1937), noted in
36 Mich. L. Rev. 660 (1938). The view is analyzed in Stern, "The Limitations
of the Power of a State under the Reserved Right to Amend or Repeal Charters of Incorporation," 53 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1(1905).
60 Zabriskie v. Hackensack & N.Y.R.Co., 18 N.J.Eq. 178 (1867); Woodfork v.
Union Bank. 3 Cold. 488 (Tenn. 1866); Kenosha, Rockford and R.I.R. Co. v.
Marsh, 17 Wis. 13 (1863).
61 Bingham v. Savings Investment & Trust Co., 101 N.J.Eq. 413, 138 A. 659
(1927), aff'd. 102 N.J.Eq. 302, 140 A. 321 (1928), involving consolidation.
627 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed., sec. 3718 (1931) ; Durfee v.
Old Colony & F-Il River R.R.. 5 Allen (87 Mass.) 230 (1862); White v. Syracuse & Utica R.R., 14 Barb. (N.Y.) 559 (1853) ; Matter of Mount Sinai Hospital, 250 N.Y. 103, 164 N.E. 871 (1928) ; Polk v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life
Ass'n, 207 U.S. 310, 28 S.Ct. 65 (1907); Looker v. Maynard, 179 U.S. 46, 21
S.Ct. 21 (1900).
63 See discussion, "Corporations-Charter Amendments-Delaware Dilemma," 35
Mrich. L. Rev. 620 (1937).
64 Dow, "Corporations-Amendment of Corporate Charters-Power of the Legislature to Authorize Changes in intra-Corporate Affairs," 34 Mich. L. Rev. 859
(1936).
65 179 U.S. 45, 21 S.Ct. 21 (1900).
6G Looker v. 'Maynard, ibid., at page 52.
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law subject to which a charter is accepted, is, at the least, to
reserve to the legislature the power to make any alteration
or amendment of a charter subject to it, which will not defeat
or substantially impair the object of the grant, or any right
vested under the grant, and which the legislature may deem
necessary to carry into effect the purpose of the grant, or to
protect the rights of the public or of the corporation, its
stockholders or creditors, or to promote the due administration
of its affairs."
In the federal courts and state courts following the majority view
the litigation has concerned definition of a "right vested under the
grant," and what legislation is deemed to "defeat or substantially
impair" it, and further as to what legislation will be considered to
"defeat or substantially impair the object of the grant. ' 67 With respect
to the majority view one line was drawn as to the extent of valid legislative interference with "vested rights" in Keller v. Wilson & Co.,6s in
which the Supreme Court of Delaware reversed the Delaware Chancellor.69 This case held a preferred stockholder's right to accrued cumulative dividends was "vested", and could not be destroyed by majority
action under statutes enacted after plaintiff acquired his stock. That
rights even so vested as these are beyond majority power derived from
subsequent legislation in Delaware has been rendered problematical by
more recent decisions. 70 It is not the purpose of this article to discuss
the majority view in detail. Many students of the subject feel that in
Delaware the recent cases are approaching the logical extremeties of
the majority view, and are subjecting the preferred stockholder to
insecurity and majority abuse unwarranted by any normal exigencies
of corporate flexibility.
Under the majority view the equitable factors considered appear
to parallel those referred to previously in connection with interpretation
of majority power to amend implied at common law or reserved expressly in the original articles. The scope of legislativ.e power is
sufficiently broad to authorize amendments increasing majority power
for corporate action in good faith and as required by legitimate
Shields v. Ohio. 95 U.S. 319, 24 L. ed. 357 (1877): Peters v. United States
,'frrtgage Co., 13 Del. Ch. 11, 114 A. 598 '1921) :. New York & New England
R.R. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556, 14 S. Ct. 437, (1894) ; cases collected in Curran,
"Mno'-itv Storkholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters," 32 Mich.
L. Rev. 743 (1933).
6821 Del. Ch. 391, 190 A. 115 (Sup.Ct. 1936) ; discussed in 35 Mich. L. Rev. 620
(1937) ; Morris v. American Public Utilities Co., 14 Del. Ch. 136, 122 A. 696
(1923) ; Davis v. Louisville Gas & Electric Co., 16 Del. Ch. 157, 142 A. 654
(1928).
6921 Del. Ch. 13, 180 A. 584 (1935), discussed in 34 Mich. L. Rev. 859 (1936).
70 Havender v. Federal United Corp., Del. Ch., 11 A. 2d. 331 (Sup. Ct. 1940);
Shanik v. White Sewing Machine Corp., Del. Ch., 19 A. 2d. 831 (Sup.Ct.1941);
notes 39 Mich. L. Rev. 1201 (1941). and 57 Harv. L. Rev. 894 (1944) ; Barrett
v. Denver Tramway Corp., (D.C. Del. 1944) 53 F. Supp. 198.
67

1946]

CORPORATION STATUTES

business need, but not broad enough to warrant unfair and discriminatory legislative destruction of the security of private investment. Under
the majority view, in states with extremely complete corporate statutory
systems including broad general powers of amendment, it is to be
expected there will be few cases in the future where action newly
authorized by the legislature is not already included in majority
amending power. In the recent Delaware cases it is often difficult
to determine whether the basis of decision is constitutional, or whether
the court is deciding on the basis of the 1927 statute which conferred on the majority a broad general power of amendment. 71 But
in states adhering to the minority view of legislative power the problem
is critical, particularly where the corporate statutory system is far
from complete. If the proposed action does not fall within majority
power for corporate action implied at common law or expressly conferred in pre-existing statutes, the majority is out. It does not get
another strike by resort to a later statute passed by the legislature
under its reserved power to alter or amefd.
THE WISCONSIN CASES

In Wisconsin the case which appears to commit the State to the
minority doctrine is Kenosha, Rockford and Rock Island Railroad Company v. Marsh,7 2 decided fifteen years after the effective date of the
Wisconsin Constitution. In 1853 plaintiff railroad was chartered to build
a line from Kenosha to Beloit. In 1857 the railroad was authorized by
state statute to build its line from Kenosha to the Illinois line near
Genoa, and still another statute later authorized consolidation with
an Illinois company building to Genoa from Rockford, Illinois. The
consolidated company sued defendant on his stock subscription, and
was nonsuited on the theory that the corporate action taken under
these statutes had effected a radical, fundamental change in the
character of the enterprise to which the subscriber had not assented.
71 This is apparent from reading the decision in Keller v. Wilson & Co., supra,
72

note 68.
17 Wis. 13 (1863); The Wisconsin Supreme Court h-s cited this case eight
times in the eighty-three years since it was decided, and each time it has been
accepted as governing in the context in which it w.s cited. Attorney General
v. Railroad Companies, 35 Wis. 425 at 570, 571 (1874); Attorney General v.
West Wisconsin Railway Co., 36 Wis. 466 at 496 (1874): Noesen v. Town of
Port Washington, 37 Wis. 168 at 174 (1875) ; Lynch v. Eastern, LaFayette &
Mississippi Ry. Co., 57 Wis. 430 at 467. 15 N.W. 743 (1883); Smith v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Co., 123 Wis. 586 at 593, 102 N. V. 57 (1905) ;
Sur-e-ior W.. L. & P. Co. v. Superior, 174 Wis. 257 at 271, 272, 181 N.W. 113
(1921): Martin Orchard Co. v. Fruit Growers C. Co., 203 Wis. 97 at 104, 233
N.W. 603 (1930) ; Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566 in dissenting
opinion at 590, 280 N.W. 868 (1938). The case has been cited twice in the federa.l courts: Superior Water Co. v. Superior, 263 U.S. 125 at 136, 44 S.Ct. 82
(1923), reversing Superior W., L. & P. Co. v. Superior, supra; and Venner
v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 28 F. 581 at 588 (C.C. Kansas, 1886).
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The Court held that the majority under their amending power implied
from the charter at common law had no power to bind a dissenter to
such a change as this without further statutory authority, and then
passed to the question as to whether such power could be obtained
by virtue of a later statute. In the language of the Court :73
"The question then remains, whether the power reserved
in the constitution to amend, alter or repeal charters should
prevent that effect. Some of the cases seem to place great
stress upon the existence of this power, and to intimate that
under it the nonassenting stock subscriber may be bound by
a change, the effect of which would otherwise be to release him.
I am wholly unable to see that it should have any such effect.***
this power was never reserved upon any idea that the legislature
could alter a contract between a corporation and its stock subscribers, nor for the purpose of enabling it to make such alteration. It was solely to avoid the effect of the decision that the
charter itself was a contract between the state and the corporation, so as to enable the state to impose such salutary
restraint upon these bodies as experience might prove to be
necessary."
The same result might have been reached by holding the change
in the enterprise to have involved substantial defeat and impairment
of the object of the grant; and thus to have been beyond the pale
of those changes possible in the contract of the members inter se,
even under the broader definition of the scope of reserved power.
A decision on this basis would have been in line with the present
day majority rule, and would have left the legislature free to effect
by statute reasonable increases in majority power for corporate action. But the Court quite clearly turned its back upon this approach,
and restricted the scope of the legislative reserved power to those
matters falling within the relation between the state and the corporation
as an entity. The Court stated :14

"So that, in all cases where charters are changed, the right
to bind stock subscribers who do not assent, seems to me to
derive no additional support from the fact that the power
of amending the charter had been reserved, but to depend
essentially upon the question whether the change is of such
a character that it may be deemed so far in furtherance of
the original undertaking, and incidental to it, as to be fairly
within the power of the corporation to bind its individual members by its corporate assent, or whether it is such a departure
from the original purpose that no member should be deemed
to have authorized the corporation to assent to it for him.
If I am correct in supposing that an amendment authorizing
7 Kenosha, Rockford & Rock Island Railroad Company v. Marsh, 17 Wis. 13
at pages 16-17 (1863).
7 Ibid., at page 18.
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an entirely different road would not be binding on the corporation without its own assent, it must follow that the question
whether any particular subscriber is bound must depend upon
the question whether he has himself assented, or whether the
rest could bind him by their assent, and not on the question
whether the legislature had power to pass the amendment."
"The power of amendment was never reserved with reference to any question between the corporation and its stock
subscribers, but solely with reference to questions between
the corporation and the state, when the latter desired to make
compulsory amendments against the wish of the former."
Possibly the Court so limited the reserved power in this case
because of a feeling that the logical implications of its scope
under the majority view would have required a holding that the
change involved in the case was valid. Similar cases, involving extension and consolidation of railroads, were fairly common at the
time; and some courts following the majority view were permitting
changes at least as substantial as the one involved in the Marsh case.75
But it is submitted the decision of the case did not require following
such cases, and hence did not require the complete nullification of the
legislative reserved power which it did involve.
Early Wisconsin cases reveal an abhorrence of the Dartmouth
College doctrine, associated with a fear of the encroachment of corporate power upon sovereign prerogative, reminiscent of a much earlier
period in English law.7 6 At least in part, this attitude resulted from
the events of the days of railroad expansion in the west. The outstanding case was Attorney General v. Railroad Companies,7 7 which

involved the power of the State to fix maximum rates by statute,
and in which Chief Justice Ryan wrote a ninety-seven page opinion
affording interesting insight into the social and economic struggle
underlying the legal controversy then before the Court. With respect
to the Dartmouth College case he stated :7
75 Peoria & Oquaka R.R. v. Elting, 17 Ill. 429 (1856); Rice v. Rock Island &
Alton R.R., 21 111. 93 (1859). TI-e Court in the Marsh case, at page 20, indicated its fear of the logical implications of the majority view in the following
language:
"Pierce, in his wo-k on railroads, p. 98, gives it as the result of the authorities, that even when the power of amending is reserved, it is not unlimited, but
'that such a radical change in the company as diverts it from its original purpose' is not binding on a dissenting shareholder. But if the power is not unlimited, where is the limit? By what principles is it to be established? I know of
none except those I have already contended for, which base the right upon the
implied authority conferred by each one who becomes a member of the corporation, on' the majority, to bind him by such changes as may fairly be regarded
as incidental to the original project."
761 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law, 2d. ed., 669-670 (1911).
7 35 Wis. 425 (1874); see also Madison, Watertown and Milwaukee Plankroad Co. v. Reynolds, 3 Wis. 287 (1854).
7 Ibid., at page 568.
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"It deprives the states of a large measure of their sovereign prerogative, and establishes great corporations as independent powers within the states, a sort of imperia in imperiis,
baffling state order, state economy, state policy."
This case involved rate regulation, a matter affecting the relation
between the state and the corporation as an entity, a matter subject
to the "salutary restraint" referred to in the Marsh opinion, and
thus within the restricted scope of the reserved power as defined in
the Marsh case. Chief Justice Ryan so held. He pointed out that
the reserved power was made a part of the State Constitution, and
thus :79

"By force of the constitutional power reserved and of the
uniform construction and application of it, the rule in the
Dartmouth College case, as applied to corporations never had
place in this state, never was the law here. The state emancipated itself from the thraldom of that decision, in the act of
becoming a state ;***"

Here, and in the Marsh case, is to be observed the early basis
for the interpretation that the reserved power extends no further
than the relation between state and corporation. 0 In Wisconsin at
least, many of the early cases arose from the struggle between state
and corporation involved in western railroad expansion. It was the
Dartmouth College situation in reverse, with the shoe on the other
foot. This time the corporations were in the saddle, and were the
aggressors. Justice Story had suggested, and the State had availed
itself of, the reserved power as a means to avoid the effect of the
Dartmouth College case, and it was natural to assume the reserved
power extended no further in scope than was required by the situa79 Ibid., at page 574.

80 In Attorney General v. Railroad Companies, supra, at page 577, Chief Justice
Ryan, referring to the reserved power in Article XI, section 1 of the Wisconsin Constitution, stated: "The power is limited by its own words only. Any
limitation of it n'ust come from those words. And we must be guided in our
construction of the words used, if the words will admit of it, by the purpose
of the provision, to do away in this state the rule in the Dartmouth College
case so far as it relates to charters of private corporations." And in the Marsh
case, at page 17, the Court stated: "The occasion of reserving such a power
either in the constitution or in charters themselves is well understood. It
grew out of the decisions of the supreme court of the United States, that
charters were contracts within the meaning of the constitutional provision
that the states should pass no laws impairing the obligation of contracts. This
was supposed to deprive the states of that power of control over corporations
which was deemed essential to the safety and protection of the public. Hence
the practice, which has extensively prevailed since those decisions, of reserving
the power of amending or repealing charters. But this power was never reserved upon any idea that the legislature could alter a contract between a corporation and its stock subscribers, nor for the purpoe of enabling it to make
such alteration. It was solely to avoid the effect of the decision that the charter itself was a contract between the state and the corporation, so as to enable the
state to impose such salutary restraint upon these bodies as experience might
prove to be necessary."

CORPORATION STATUTES

tion which created it. And so the Court stated its scope could not
include the contract of the stockholders inter se; could not authorize
legislative increase of majority power; even though such statement
was not necessary in most of the decisions in which it was made.
Even in the Marsh case such restriction of the reserved power might
have been avoided by holding that the change in enterprise involved
there was too broad and substantial even under the reserved power
to be binding upon dissenters.
There have been other cases concerning the same issue as the
Railroad Companies case, involving the liability of local public utilities to regulation, 81 legislative power to repeal a corporate tax exemp3
tion, 2 to impose on public utilities the expense of state regulation,
and to compel a municipal corporation to comply with health regulations concerning water polution. 84 The Marsh case has been cited,
but its rule has not been modified. Many cases, like the Bradley
Knitting case,8 5 have involved corporate power to take certain action
against the complaint of dissenting members that the proposed action
exceeded corporate power as defined in their original contracts. In
some of these cases the Marsh case has been cited for the proposition
that a fundamental, radical change in corporate purpose violates the
contract. No question of legislative impairment of the contract is
involved in such cases.
Naaro v. Merchants Mutual Insurance Company,8 1 decided before the Marsh case, contains dictum possibly in conflict with it;
81 Superior Water, Light and Power Co. v. City of Superior, 174 Wis. 257, 181

N.W. 113 (1921), reversed, 263 U.S. 125, 44 S. Ct. 82 (1923); see also State
v. Milwaukee Gas Light Co., 29 WVis. 454 (1872) ; Calumet Service Co. v. Chilton, 148 Wis. 334, 135 N.W. 131 (1912); State ex rel. Attorney General v.
Nortlbern Pacific R. Co., 157 Wis. 73, 147 N.W. 219 (1914); Wisconsin Tractinn, L., TT. & P. Co. v. Menasha, 157 Wis. 1, 145 N.W. 231 (1914); State ex
rel. Northern Pacific R. Co. v. Railroad Commission, 140 Wis. 145, 121 N.W.
919 (1909).
82 West Wisconsin R.R. Co. v. Supervisors of Trempealeau Co., 35 Wis. 257
(1874); also State v. Railway Companies, 128 Wis. 449, 108 N.W. 594 (1906),
involving the taxing power.
83 Visconsin Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 206 Wis. 589, 240 N.W.
411 (1932).
84 State ex rel. Martin v. Juneau, 238 Wis. 564, 300 N.W. 187 (1941) ; Statute required railroads to fence their lines, Blair v. Milwaukee & Prairie du Chien
Rd. Co., 20 Wis. 254 (1866). The court stated the police power was sufficient
to justify the regulation, and refused to discuss the applicability of the reserved
power to amend. See also Water Power Cases, 148 Wis. 124, 134 N.W. 330
(1912).
85 Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566, 280 N.W. 688 (1938) ; Martin

Orchard Company v. Fruit Grower's Canning Co., 203 Wis. 97, 233 N.W. 603
(1930) ; Attorney General v. West Wisconsin Railway Co., 36 Wis. 466 (1874),
quo warranto on theory corporation was acting in excess of charter power;
Noesen v. Town of Port Washington, 37 Wis. 168 (1875) ; Lynch v. Eastern,
LaFayette and Mississippi Railway Co., 57 Wis. 430 (1883); Welch v. Land
Development Co., 246 Wis. 124, 16 N.W. 2d. 402 (1944); Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift, 238 Wis. 628, 300 N.W. 760 (1941) ; Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers
Mfg. Co., 159 Wis. 517, 149 N.W. 754 (1915).

8614 Wis. 319 (1861).
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but the constitutional issue was not before the Court. In this case
the legislature, by acts dated 1858 and January, 1860, authorized the
corporate trustees to change the organization of the company from
the mutual to the joint stock plan. In April, 1860, as a part of the
amending scheme, the legislature made effective a statute permitting
dissenters to obtain the value of their memberships as determined
by court appointed appraisers. Instead of suing to enjoin the whole
statutory amending scheme, the plaintiff sued under it for the value
of his stock pursuant to the appraisal statute. The Court upheld
plaintiff's right to proceed under the statute, and its remarks on the
constitutional issue must be considered dictum. The Court stated 87
"It seems to be conceded on both sides, that it was competent
for the legislature, both by virtue of the power reserved in
the organic act of the company, and of section 1 of article XI
of the constitution, to pass the amendatory acts of April 15,
1858, and January 31st, 1860, by which the trustees were authorized to change the plan and organization of the company
from the mutual to the joint stock system. Indeed, with a
single exception, none of their provisions appear liable to any
constitutional objection whatever. The first section of the first
named act declares that the trustees may adopt the mode of
insuring practiced by insurance companies; and may open books
for the subscription of stock, at such time and place and under
such restrictions as they may deem proper. This is a grant
to the trustees of new and distinct powers, such as they could
not before have exercised, either as a matter of corporate authority or of legal or constitutional right, as between themselves
or the corporation and the shareholders. The latter might have
objected to it as a violation of the contract under which they
became members of the company. But for the reserved power
of the legislature to alter or repeal the charter, this objection
would be still open to them."
Thus the Court approved a doctrine apparently contrary to that
later pronounced in the Marsh case. But in the next sentence the
Court stated :"If the act had declared that the members might adopt a
new mode of insurance, and open books for the subscription
of stock, no exception could have been taken to it. It would
then have required the assent of all the members to have accomplished the proposed change."
The Court appeared concerned over the distinction between permissive and compulsory statutes; but what matters it to the dissenter
whether his contract is changed directly by the trustees under a
Ibid., at pages 324-325.
88Ibid., at page 325.
87
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"compulsory" statute, or through majority stockholder action under
a statute "permitting" such action?
Likewise, in Smith v. Northwestern National Life Insurance Company,89 a statute of 1899 gave to mutual insurance companies the
power to change to a premium basis. The company involved, organized as a mutual company in 1891, proceeded to take advantage
of the statute. Plaintiff, a mutual member, brought suit for the
value of his interest. The Court held the statute valid because it
had provided particularly against change in the interests of mutual
members, but made the following pertinent comments :o
"In construing such statute it must be remembered that
the state has only reserved power to modify the contract between itself and the corporation which is involved in the latter's
charter or franchise, ahd that the constitutional prohibition
against impairing the obligation of contracts was in full force
in protection of any contracts which a corporation might have
made with others." (Citing the Nazro and Marsh cases)
On the next page, the Court branded the above remark as dictum,
stating:
"So we must conclude that the legislature intended no impairment of plaintiff's contract, and any discussion of its powers
in that respect is but academic."
Then there is the case of Huber v. Martin,9 decided in 1906,
in which, oddly enough, Justice Marshall did not refer to the Marsh
case, the Nazro case, or any of the Wisconsin cases which followed
them, although the facts of the case and the basis of decision clearly
involved the issues here discussed. Plaintiffs were members in a
mutual insurance company, organized in 1854. They sued for equitable
relief against a reorganization which involved creation of a new
corporation to take over the business on a stock basis. The reorganization was undertaken under a general statute of 1903, which authorized
conversion of mutual companies to stock companies. The Court stated
members in mutual insurance companies were stockholders, the same
as stockholders in any business corporation, and entitled to the same
consideration. The reorganization statute was held unconstutional
because retroactive, and the decision, in general, is on all fours in
result with the Marsh case, although that case was not mentioned,
nor was the Dartmouth College case. The Court approved a New
Jersey case following the minority doctrine, 92 but did not discuss
89

123 Wis. 586, 102 N.W. 57 (1905).

90 Ibid., at page 593.

91 127 Wis. 412, 105 N.W. 1031 (1906) ; 132 Wis. 86, 111 N.W. 1107 (1907).
92 Schwarzwaelder v. German Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 59 N.J.Eq. 589, 44 A.
769 (1899).
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the reserved power or follow the reasoning of the cases interpreting
it. In the words of the Court :
"The right of the corporation to hold its property in harmony with that situation, and the rights of the members to
have the same so held and administered, were property interests
resting on contractual obligations and so within the guaranty of
the state constitution as regards the passage of laws impairing
the obligations of contract, sec. 12, art. I, Const. of Wis.,
and that of the national constitution as regards the deprivation
of property without due process of law, or denying to persons
the equal protection of the laws. XIVth Amend. U. S. Const.
Due process of law does not extend to the taking of private
property or the violation of private rights for private ends.
The act of the legislature in question, in terms or in effect,
authbrizes the appropriation of the property of one private
corporation and the equitable interests therein of the members thereof to the use of another private corporation and
of its members in violation of the corporate charter rights
of the former corporation, and in defihnce of the wishes of
such of its members as do not choose to consent thereto. The
proposition affirmed by counsel for respondents, stated at the
outset in the opinion, must, therefore, be answered in the
negative. The act of the legislature, ch. 229, Laws of 1903,
is unconstitutional and void and furnishes no justification for
the acts complained of."
This decision might well be classed among those few supporting
the position that legislative power over the corporate contract should
be considered in terms of the police power and due process, without
even lip service to the reserved power to amend. 4 This position
need not, like the minority view of the reserved power, result in
nullification of any legislative power to increase majority corporate
power. However, it has been pointed out before in this article that
decisions such as this one stand alone; the law has not developed
along this line; and it is doubtful if it will in view of the mass of
decisions dealing with the subject in terms of the reserved power
to alter or amend.
g3 Supra, note 91, at page 439. The constitutional issue was ineffectually raised
in another insurance company case, Wisconsin T.M.R. Co. v. Calumet C.M.F.
Ins. Co., 224 Wis. 109, 271 N.W. 51 (1937), where the Court stated at pages
119-120: "As to the defendant's contention raised by the amendment to the
answer that secs. 202.15 to 202.18, inclusive, Stats., are unconstitutional and
void as to the contracts of members of defendant company, we are of the
opinion that there is no inv.sion of the rights of individual members or of the
defendant, nor violation of any constitutional provision. There was no particular effort to show what policies of defendant company were in force
before these statutes were passed, and contracts made after that time must
have been made in contemplation of the statues." See Wright v. Minnesota
Mutual Life Insurance Co., 193 U.S. 657, 24 S.Ct. 594 (1904), where the
opposite result was reached by a court following the majority view, but where
the court found the changes in issue to have been included within original

majority amending power.

94 See note 52, supra.

19461

CORPORATION STATUTES

The case of State ex rel. Cleary v. Hopkins Street Building and
Loan Association 5 has been stated previously, but its constitutional
aspect was left to this point for discussion. The court held that the
Federal Home Owner's Loan Act did not intend "conversion" of
a state building and loan association to federal incorporation unless
the state had legislation authorizing its corporation to act under the
federal statute.96 There was no state enabling legislation in the case,
so no constitutional issue was decided. However, the court did discuss
the situation which would have been presented had the federal act
by its terms authorized action under it without regard to state authorization, and concluded .
"*** it would divest stockholders of their rights in the
corporation under state law and substitute therefor rights alleged
to be equivalent in a corporation organized under the laws of
the United States. As pointed out elsewhere in this opinion,
this would raise serious constitutional questions, for a corporate
charter is not only contractual between the state and its creature
corporation, but it is also contractual with respect to the rights
of a stockholder in a corporation."

It would seem any stockholder could make the same constitutional
complaint should his corporation proceed to merge or consolidate
with another corporation, foreign or domestic, under authority of
a state statute effective after he acquired his stock. There also he
would be forced to give up his stock, "and substitute therefor rights
alleged to be equivalent" in another corporation. Or would it make
a difference that the other corporation was of Illinois and not the
United States?
The case contains further dictum, indicating at least no departure
from the doctrine of the Marsh case. At another point the Court
states :"
"There can be no doubt but that it was intended by the
framers of the constitution to reserve in the state the power
to alter or repeal the charter of any corporation created by
the legislature. The constitution having thus limited the power
of the legislature, it would seem to follow that the legislature is
without authority to divest itself of the power reserved to
it by the constitution. But if it should be held that the legislature
95217 Wis. 179, 257 N.W. 684 (1935),

aff'd. 296 U.S. 315, 56 S.Ct. 235 (1935),
noted in 19 Marq. L. Rev. 139 (1935).
96 "There must be some plain enactment authorizing the merger or consolidation,
for legislative authority is just as essential thereto as it is to the creation of
the corporation in the first instance." 15 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations,
rep. vol., sec. 7048 (1938). Justice Cardozo, in the Supreme Court decision,
held that the federal statute did intend "conversion," irrespective of state statutory authority therefore, and in that respect held the federal statute unconstitutional.
97
Supra, note 95, page 192.
98 Supra, note 95, 189-190.
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has such power, it is still constitutionally disabled from authorizing any part of the stockholders of a corporation created by
it, to impose a new charter upon non-consenting members
of the corporation."
The cases discussed announce the rule that the reserved power
is not sufficiently broad in scope to permit legislative change to the
business contract of the stockholders in a corporation. In other words,
legislation conferring previously non-existent majority power upon
the majority is invalid as against an objecting minority which previously acquired its stock. Corporate action under such amendments
requires unanimous stockholder consent. There are no direct holdings
to this effect, other than the Marsh and Huber cases. But since the
Marsh case a doctrine has been intoned which was not really necessary to the decision of the cases which sustained it, and which was
dictum in most of them. That it is alive today is evidenced by a remark to be found in the dissenting opinion in the Bradley Knitting
Company case :99
"It was early held by this court that the clause of our state
constitution reserving the right to change corporate charters
after their adoption did not apply to the contract rights of
stockholders secured by the corporate charter." (Citing the
Marsh case).
CONCLUSION

Any discussion of legislation in the light of the cases discussed above
can do little more than indicate the approach to the problem, and the
difficulties to be encountered with different general types of statutes.
Legislation amending the corporation statutes of the state may, for instance, be classified as compulsory or mandatory,'-" or permissive in
character. So far as the interests of the dissenting stockholder are concerned, there appears little to differentiate the two. Even though the
statute be permissive in its expression, its imposition of majority rule as
to a matter which required unanimous action before, or was prohibited to the corporation altogether, is compulsory as regards the
dissenter. Compulsory or permissive, the time for the dissenter to
take action against the operation of the statute upon his rights is
when the majority proposes action under it by corporate resolution.
It has been concluded that if proposed action is within majority
power as expressly defined in, or to be implied from, the corporate
contract as of the time the dissenter acquired his stock, then the
dissenter is by his own contract subject to the proposed action, even
if it is taken pursuant to a later statute, and has no valid complaint.
This opens a broad field of inquiry which must be answered upon
99Johnson v. Bradley Knitting Co., 228 Wis. 566 at 590. 280 N.W. 688 (1938).
100 7 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed., sec. 3717 (1931).
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the facts of each particular case. Within the scope of corporate power
as defined within the present Wisconsin corporation statutes, the possible field of legislative action still within present majority corporate
power may be fairly broad, particularly in view of the liberal interpretation of the Bradley Knitting Company case. 101

Section 180.02,102 after enumerating matters to be contained in
the articles, concludes with the provision: "Such other provisions, not
inconsistent with law, as they may deem proper to he therein
inserted." In other words, the incorporators, and the majority later
through amendment under Section 180.07, may place in the articles
provisions covering any matter of corporate procedure or power so
long as they do not conflict with statutory provision concerning them,
or with judicial decisions defining state public policy.10 3 However,
101 Supra, note 99.
102

Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 180.02.

103 Welch v. Land Development Co., 246 Wis. 124,16 N.W. 2d. 402 (1944), where

holders of retired preferred stock claimed accrued cumulative dividends either
as such, or their equivalent as interest on their investment. It was held there
could be no lawful corporate authorization for the payments demanded because of limitations placed upon preferred stock preferences by Wis. Stat.
(1943), secs. 182.13(1), and 182.19(1). The corporation could not, by amendment of its articles or otherwise, act in conflict with such statutory limitations. The Court stated at pages 131-132: "As the defendant, in its articles of
incorporation, could provide for preferred stock in only the manner and
subject to the above-stated limitations in secs. 1759a and 1765, Stats. 1911, it
would have been beyond its power to provide in its amended Art III, or in
any other manner, for the issuance of preferred stock which would not be
subject to the statutory limitations that the preference, which may be given
to such stock, is limited to 'not exceeding the par value thereof over the common stock in the distribution of the corporate assets other than profits,' and
that 'no dividend shall * * * be declared or paid * * * except out of net profits
properly applicable thereto and which shall not in any way impair or diminish
the capital.' Those statutory limitations are as effectively a part of issued
certificates of stock and as binding upon holders thereof as though they
were printed thereon. * * * ; and to those statutory limitations there is applicable the rule that 'When the legislative will is expressed in the peremptory terms of such a statute, it 'is paramount and absolute, and cannot be
varied or waived by the private conventions of the parties.' Jones v. Preferred
Accident Ins. Co., 226 Wis. 423, 426, 275 N.W. 897. Consequently, neither those
limitations nor the additional limitation in sec. 1759a, that 'Neither preferred
nor common stock shall bear interest,' can be avoided or waived or varied by
any provision in defendant's articles of incorporation or other private conventions of the parties." See also 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Wis., 1934) 6, stating
that under section 182.13, preferred stock must be preferred as to dividends,
and cannot possess exclusive voting rights under any circumstances. See
further Hull v. Pfister and Vogel Leather Co., 235 Wis. 653, 294 N.W. 18
(1940); and for a permitted provision, Casper v. Kalt-Zimmers Mfg. Co.,
159 Wis. 517, 149 N.W. 754 (1915), holding valid a provision in the articles
requiring original subscribers to offer their stock to the board of directors
before offering it for sale to outsiders. Farmer's M. & S. Co. v. Lann, 146
Wis. 252, 131 N.W. 366 (1911); Good v. Starker, 207 Wis. 567, 242 N.W. 204
(1932); 31 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Wis., 1942) 354. Milwaukee Sanitarium v.
Swift, 238 Wis. 628, 300 N.W. 760 (1941), held valid an amendment made
to the articles in good faith which authorized issue of stock to employees and
officers without recognizing plaintiff's asserted pre-emptive rights. It was
pointed out that the pre-emptive right has certain recognized limitations based
upon business necessity, and the stockholder is deemed to contract with reference to them.
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where the state statutes entirely fail to mention an important matter
of procedure or power, the question arises as to whether the door
is open for provision concerning it in the original articles.
It is obvious that statutory consolidation and merger are majority
powers which cannot exist in the absence of legislative sanction, and
likely that practical accomplishment of the same thing by a going
concern through sale of assets for stock in another corporation cannot be achieved in the absence of a statute more clearly authorizing
such procedure than does Section 180.11(2). Quite clearly provision
for consolidation and merger cannot be written into original articles
today. 0 4 It has been concluded previously that majority action to
effect them under new statutes would very likely be invalid against
a dissenter as a fundamental change under the common law doctrine
of implied charter power, and as a voidable assumption of previously
non-existent charter authority under the doctrine of the Marsh case.
It is submitted that a statute giving pre-existing Wisconsin corporations the power to merge or consolidate cannot be operative without
unanimous shareholder consent, unless the doctrine of the Marsh
decision is overruled.
Section 180.07(1)"15 gives the present corporation power to amend
its articles by majority action, "to modify or enlarge its business or
purposes, change its name or location, increase or diminish its capital
stock, change its officers or its directors," and finally to "provide
anything which might have been originally provided in such articles."
There is the added limitation that "no corporation without stock
shall change substantially the original purposes of its organization",
possibly implying that stock corporations can do so. It does not appear
that the clause allowing provision by amendment for anything eligible
for inclusion in the original articles has been judicially interpreted
as limited to those matters specifically enumerated immediately before
it.10 6 If, as appears, the clause is not so limited, there results a
broad field of allowable amendment within the general clause in

question. But, according to the minority view, this clause still does
104 See supra, footnote 40.
105 Wis. Stat. (1943), sec.

180.07(1).
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, perm. ed., sec. 3648 (1931). In Johnson
v. Bradley Knitting Co., supra., the Court stated at page 580: "Under sec.
180.07(1), Stats., a corporation may amend its articles of organization in
any respect which might have been originally provided in its articles," and
did not mention any of the specific matters, upon which amendment may be
had, listed previously in the section. None of the cases construing the section appear to have imposed any such limitation upon the scope of the clause.
See also Milwaukee Sanitarium v. Swift, discussed supra, note 103, where under this clause of section 180.07(1), amendment authorizing issue of stock
in disregard of pre-emptive rights was upheld.

1067

CORPORATION STATUTES
not let in amendments providing for consolidation or merger under
7

a subsequent statute authorizing themU
Limitations of space prevent detailed consideration of very many
proposed or recently enacted amendments to the corporation statutes.
Cumulative voting has been suggested as a desirable subject for legislation.'" Its practical effect is to give minority stockholder groups a
relatively larger voting power. It is not mentioned in Wisconsin
statutes, but it could conceivably be argued that it is eligible for
inclusion in original articles by virtue of the clause in Section 182.15"19
which precedes the provision entitling every shareholder to "one vote
for each share of stock held. and owned by him at every meeting",
namely: unless "a provision to the contrary is inserted in the articles".
However, the Attorney General has ruled that provisions for cumu-

lative voting cannot be validly inserted in the original articles, and this
view is supported by opinion from other general quarters. 1 0 It appears likely that cumulative voting stands on much the same footing
as consolidation.
As was pointed out with reference to the Bradley Knitting Company
case,' 11 a broad power of amendment with reference to preferred
stock, and its dividend, voting, and preference rights stems from
Section 182.13. No doubt, much new legislation as to such matters
'10

modem corporation acts contain sections giving dissenting stockholders
an election to obtain payment for their shares under an appraisal procedure
provided by statute, in the event at least of such consequential majority action
as consolidation or merger, sale of all the assets for stock in another corporation, etc. See Illinois Rev. Stat. (State Bar Asso. ed. 1945), Ch. 32, secs.
157.70, 157.73. Such statutes have been held valid against dissenters who
acquired their stock before their passage, by courts following the majority
view, and the presence of the appraisal remedy has without question moved
the courts to give the consolidation and other statutes favorable consideration.
Curran, "Minority Stockholders and the Amendment of Corporate Charters,"
32 Mich. L. Rev. 743 at 758-764 (1934); Lattin, "Remedies of Dissenting
Shareholders under Appraisal Statutes," 45 Harv. L. Rev. 233 (1931) ; Lattin,
"A Reappraisal of Appraisal Statutes," 38 Mich. L. Rev. 1165 (1940); 15
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, rep. vol., sec. 7165 (1938). But even with
the appraisal remedy included, the dissenter's original contract is changed.
He is simply given an election, to have his stock replaced by stock in a new
corporation, or to turn it in for cash on an appraisal basis. At best, something
resembling dissolution as to him is forced upon him, but the dissolution analogy
is not a complete one. Certainly this kind of dissolution was not part of his
original contract. Thus, even with the appraisal procedure included in the new
consolidation statute, courts following decisions announcing the doctrine of
the Marsh case could not uphold it without overruling those decisions at
least in effect. This was done in New Jersey: Bingham v. Savings Investment
& Trust Co., 101 N.J.Eq. 413, 138 A. 659 (1927), aff'd. 102 N.J.Eq. 302, 140.A.
321 (1928), and in an early case where no legislative power of amendment
Most

was reserved, Lauman v. Lebanon Valley R.R., 30 Pa. 42, 72 Am. Dec. 685
(1858).

10s Levin, "Blind Spots in the Present Wisconsin General Corporation Statutes,"

1939 Wis. L. Rev. 173 at 193.
209 Wis. Stat. (1943), sec. 182.15.
110 18 Ops. Atty. Gen. (Wis., 1929), 429; 5 Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations,
221

perm. ed., sec. 2048 (1931).
Supra, note 99.
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may well escape the issue of the Marsh case because it can be interpreted as not enlarging previous majority power, but a query is advanced concerning the effect of Chapter 467, Laws of Wisconsin
(1945), amending Section 182.13(3), and giving second preferred
stock a new right to vote as a class on any change in relation to
preferred stock of either class, and denying to first preferred a vote
with relation to certain named changes in the second preferred. This
section easily could operate to place the first preferred in a less
advantageous position in a particular situation than under the previous voting procedure. Such voting provisions no doubt were ineligible for inclusion in original articles before this section. Certainly they would conflict with the section as written before; "No
change*** shall be made, except by amendment to the articles adopted
by a vote of three-fourths of the preferred***". Query as to whether
such procedure can now be enforced against the dissent of a first
preferred stockholder under the Marsh decision.
It becomes clear that adherence to the doctrine of the Marsh
case can have the effect of hamstringing the legislature to amendments
of corporation statutes which do not enlarge majority power for
corporate action. Such a prospect is alarming, to put the matter mildly.
As the Court said in the Bradley Knitting Company case :112
"In this day and age of corporate activity, it would be a
serious matter to hold that one per cent of the stockholders
of a corporation could defeat the will of the other ninety-nine
per cent."
Yet the doctrine of the Marsh case does call for such a holding.
It is submitted that the natural growth of business law in a fluid
society will not be halted by such a doctrine. That it has not been
elsewhere is only evidence of the fundamental truth. To put the
matter concretely, it cannot halt the legislative process, nor can it
halt the matter from arising again and again for decision. Such a
doctrine can only survive indefinitely in a purely static condition of
economic affairs. Its existence finds ready explanation in the peculiar
history surrounding the Dartmouth College case and the development
of the reserved power, in cases where the problems of today were
not before the courts. Paradoxically, the doctrine found expression
in many decisions which in result actually extended the legislative
police power. There is reason and more to overrule the case and
clear the law of its lurking threat to natural corporate growth.
Nor can it be effectively argued that the alternatives to such
a rule constitute any measurable threat to the safety of private
investment, or open the door to majority abuse. In only one state
112 Supra, note 99, at page 580.
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have the logical implications of the majority view had results in
judicial decision which give even half-hearted support to the alarmist.
The doctrine of "vested rights" has proved generally adequate to
control legislative abuse, and in spite of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, there
remains the Constitution and due process.
For these reasons it is submitted that the Marsh case should be
overruled when and if the matter should arise for decision, in order
to leave to the Wisconsin Legislature a power of change commensurate with that of legislatures in most other states. However, the
case still is the law, and should be considered by those responsible
for the drafting of new corporate legislation. It is suggested that
such legislation, when drafted, might well be worded to include language preserving the validity of the legislation as to corporations
formed subsequent to its effective date, in the event of a court decision
declaring it unconstitutional upon the objection of stockholders in
corporations existing prior to its effective date.11 3

113 See Model Business Corporation Act, Secs. 62 and 64, in 9 U.L.A. 152, 153

(1942).

